

Denotes a sensitive group that employees needed to request access to join.  
Summary was still obfuscated due to previous criticism from leadership.



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February 11 · Add Topics

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## Delhi local elections, 2020

### Inauthentic activity remediation summary

The Indian union territory of Delhi held legislative assembly elections on February 8th. Although a local election, Delhi has a population of perhaps 25 million - comparable to many small countries.

In the lead-up to the Delhi elections, we placed 1,090 likely inauthentic actors in UFAC; these actors were identified as acting to inauthentically coordinate to support a specific political party ("Party A") en masse with specific coordinated messages in the Delhi elections. Many of these actors initially expressed positive support for a second Indian political party ("Party B") as an apparent means of gaining crossover support for Party A, before becoming more critical of Party B closer to the election. Responses consisted of 713 UFAC enrollments on 2/4, and 377 UFAC enrollments of recidivists on 2/6. We looked for and did not see a third return of the inauthentic actors after 2/6, though it is possible that they returned and evaded our detection.

Actors as in people doing something/etc. NOT Bollywood.

Party B = BJP

Party A = AAP

State B = Punjab

Very unusually, most of these inauthentic actors had also previously been acting to boost a different Indian political party ("Party C") in a separate Indian state ("State B") prior to mid-January and continued their activity on both groups. A prior takedown of 600 accounts primarily acting to boost Party C in State B in mid-December resulted in their immediate return. In the course of their support for Party C in State B, many of these actors also expressed strong criticism of Party B [even as they later supported it in Delhi]

Party C = INC

As a result, the 1.1k users affected by our pre-election takedowns also included [for completeness] groups of inauthentic actors who were only acting in State B to boost Party C, and had not extended their activity to the Delhi elections under the assumption that they could similarly seek to extend their activity later on. This included several authentic actors associated with the the official Party C in State B who appeared to be coordinating inauthentic accounts purely supporting Party C in State B from device/network-level signals. After the takedowns, we did see



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For due diligence, note that we were not able to establish conclusive attribution between the inauthentic activity supporting Party A and actors in Party A. Furthermore, for fairness, note that we have also seen inauthentic political activity supporting Party B in a separate location in India [without upcoming elections] that is directly tied to a sitting Lok Sabha MP of Party B. I requested that the takedowns include this activity as well for fairness despite the lack of upcoming elections, but it was not deemed worthwhile.

Apologies for the vagueness and obfuscation used in this descriptor due to the sensitivity of the topic. Many thanks to [REDACTED] for supporting the takedown and a willingness to act aggressively in order to remediate the harm before the election. In addition, many thanks to [REDACTED] and others for stepping up to help prioritize this case after I presented on it at CVI summit two weeks prior.



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